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Do acquisitions boost patents? An empirical analysis on Chinese and Indian Emerging Market Multinationals in Europe, Japan and USA

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Motivation

- The Economist (September 12th, 2015): “*The New Silk Road. China’s latest wave of globalisers will enrich their country (– and the world)*”.

Is this empirically verified?

- There are a few recent studies investigating the impact of FDI on **EMNEs economic performance** (Cozza, Rabelotti & Sanfilippo, CER 2015; Chen and Tang, ADR 2014; Edamura et al, CER 2014 and with a focus on acquisitions Buckley et al, JWB 2014; Lebedev et al, JWB 2015; Nicholson and Salaber, IBR 2013);
- **What about their innovative impact?** There are just a few case studies, such as those on the white goods industry (Bonaglia et al, JWB 2007; Duysters et al, ICC 2009), the alternative energy sector (Awate et al, GSJ 2012; Hansen et al, JEG 2014) and the pharma industry (Kedron and Bagchi-Sen, JEG 2012) and a recent econometric study on China (Anderson et al, IBR 2015);
- We know very little about whether **EMNEs do benefit – in terms of their innovative output – from FDI and what factors are likely to condition this impact;**
- Here we focus on the **acquisitions of EU27, Japanese and US companies made by Chinese and Indian multinationals** in the period 2003-2011 and **analyze their impact on the patent portfolio of the acquirers.**

The literature on acquisitions and innovation

- The empirical literature examining the **effects of acquisitions on the innovation capacity of the acquirers** is not conclusive:
 - **Positive impact** due to complementarity of knowledge (Makri et al, SMJ 2010) and economies of scale and scope in R&D processes (Valentini, SMJ 2012);
 - **Negative impact** due to costs of integration and reduced motivations of R&D personnel (Colombo and Rabbiosi, RP 2014);
- Factors playing a role on the innovative outcome of acquisitions:
 - Absolute (and relative) knowledge base of the target (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloudt, Hagedoorn, and Van Kranenburg, 2006);
 - Institutional distance between the target and the acquirer (Cloudt et al, 2006; Björkman, Stahl, and Vaara, 2007);
 - Past investment experience of the acquirer.

EMNEs strategic asset seeking motivations in acquisitions

- EMNEs are increasingly undertaking M&As aimed at acquiring technology, brands, marketing and R&D capabilities, distribution networks, managerial and organizational skills (Rabbiosi, Elia, and Bertoni 2012, Buckley et al. 2007);
- While we know a lot about EMNEs asset-seeking motivations for undertaking M&As, we still know little about the impact of acquisitions on EMNEs innovative outputs.

Three dimensions influence the EMNEs innovative output after an acquisition

- ① The previous (to the deal) patenting experience of the acquiring firm;
- ② The patenting portfolio of the target firm;
- ③ The knowledge base of the region in which the target firm is located.

Our hypotheses

- H1: The larger is the previous (to the deal) patenting experience of the *acquirer* the higher is its capacity of exploiting the knowledge resources available in the target firm;
- H2: The stronger is the knowledge base of the *target firm* the higher is the innovative impact on the acquiring EMNE;
- H3: The stronger is the knowledge base of the *target region* the higher is the innovative impact on the acquiring EMNE.

Data

- All completed majority stake cross-border acquisitions by Indian and Chinese MNEs in EU27, Japan and USA from 2003 to 2011: 466 deals;
- The data source is **EMENDATA (Emerging Multinationals Events and Networks DATAbase)** aggregating Zephyr and SDC Platinum (28% of the acquisitions are only reported in Zephyr and 31% are only in SDC Platinum);
- Medium and high-tech sectors (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloudt et al, 2006; Valentini and Di Guardo, 2012).

Table 1 - Distribution of deals by country of origin, macro-sector, and top destinations (# and %) (2003-2011)

| | Total | | Manufacturing | | Services | | Top destinations (#) |
|--------------|------------|------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|---|
| China | 95 | 20.39 | 59 | 28.23 | 36 | 14.01 | United States (30), Germany (20), Japan (9), France (9) |
| India | 371 | 79.61 | 150 | 71.77 | 221 | 85.99 | United States (176), United Kingdom (78), Germany (32) |
| Total | 466 | 100 | 209 | 100 | 257 | 100 | |

Dependent Variable

- *NUM_INPADOC_FAMILIES* measured as the cumulative number of distinct INPADOC families containing patents applications filed by the acquirer at any patent office in the **three years after the deal**;
- **INPADOC family** is a set of patent applications filed in multiple countries **for protecting a single invention** (Martinez, 2010);
 - The advantage of this approach over the use of EPO or USPTO patent applications is 1) **to eliminate the home bias** and 2) **to avoid double counting**;
 - Patent data are retrieved from ORBIS BvD and then checked manually with EPO-PATSTAT (version April 2014). The INPADOC families of the patents applications are retrieved from EPO-PATSTAT, as well as all the related patent information (i.e. backward citations, filing dates, technological classes).

Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics on Acquirer and Target patents pre- and after the acquisition

| | | ACQUIRER | | | | TARGET | |
|--------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| | | # <i>INPADO C FAMILIES</i> | | # <i>INPADO C FAMILIES FORWARD CITATIONS</i> | | # <i>INPADO C FAMILIES</i> | # <i>INPADO C FAMILIES FORWARD CITATIONS</i> |
| | | Pre- Acquisition | After- Acquisition | Pre- Acquisition | After- Acquisition | Pre- Acquisition | Pre- Acquisition |
| China | <i>#</i> | 2789 | 3369 | | | 10335 | |
| | <i>Mean</i> | 29.484 | 36.168 | 34.421 | 44.663 | 108.895 | 191.063 |
| | <i>SD</i> | 131.584 | 123.934 | 140.392 | 154.688 | 1042.003 | 1809.751 |
| | <i>Min</i> | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | <i>Max</i> | 1213 | 691 | 1254 | 819 | 10158 | 17644 |
| India | <i>#</i> | 1517 | 1924 | | | 365 | |
| | <i>Mean</i> | 7.943 | 8.604 | 31.275 | 26.752 | 1.005 | 3.315 |
| | <i>SD</i> | 33.779 | 31.678 | 135.784 | 100.448 | 6.280 | 16.376 |
| | <i>Min</i> | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | <i>Max</i> | 343 | 347 | 1323 | 1300 | 99 | 189 |

Note: *INPADO C FAMILIES FORWARD CITATIONS* are calculated as number of distinct *INPADO C families* citing the focal *INPADO C family* in the 5 years after its priority date

Independent Variables

- *ACQUIRER_KNOW_BASE*: sum of INPADOC families with patents filed **by the acquirer** in the 5 years before the deal and their citations;
- *TARGET_KNOW_BASE* : sum of INPADOC families with patents filed **by the target** in the 5 years before the deal and their citations;
- *REGIONAL_KNOW_BASE*: log of cumulative number of per capita patent applications in the 5 years before the deal in the TL2 (e.g. NUTS2) region where the target firm is located (OECD Regional Database).

Control variables

- *MA_EXPERIENCE*: cumulative number of acquirer's majority acquisitions and greenfield investments up to the year of the deal;
- *HORIZONTAL_MA*: dummy equal to 1 when both the target and the acquirer belong to the same SIC2 digit;
- *INSTITUTIONAL_DIST*: institutional distance between the countries of the target and the acquirer (Berry, Guillén and Zhou, JIBS 2010);
- *NO_BIG_ACQ*: dummy equal to 1 if the acquirer does not belong to the "Large" and "Very Large" categories, as defined in ORBIS;
- *CHINA_DUMMY*; *JAPAN_DUMMY* and *US_DUMMY*;
- Year dummies.

Econometric methodology

- Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimation with industry fixed effects at NACE Main Section level;
- Robustness checks:
 - Control for the possibility that patenting & acquiring might not be independent (Valentini and Di Guardo, 2012) with a **two-stage count model with sample selection** adding an auxiliary equation controlling for the probability to carry out an international acquisition (Bratti and Miranda, 2011);
 - **Zero-inflated Poisson regressions** due to the high number of zeros (Hu and Jefferson, 2009).

| | Dep. Var.: NUMBER OF INPADOC PATENTS | | | | | | | | | Dep. Var.: N USPTO PATENTS |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Controls | | Independent variables | | Full | | Full with interactions | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| TARGET_KNOW_BASE | | -0.0031*** (0.0004) | | | -0.0022*** (0.0000) | -0.0010* (0.0005) | 0.0377*** (0.0096) | -0.0010** (0.0004) | -0.0046*** (0.0012) | -0.0016*** (0.0001) |
| ACQUIRER_KNOW_BASE | | | 0.0018*** (0.0003) | | 0.0020*** (0.0004) | 0.0030*** (0.0003) | 0.0030*** (0.0003) | -0.0048 (0.0027) | 0.0030*** (0.0003) | 0.0027*** (0.0005) |
| REGION_KNOW_BASE | | | | -0.0281 (0.1156) | 0.0659 (0.1468) | -0.0195 (0.0371) | -0.0072 (0.0382) | -0.0850** (0.0310) | -0.0162 (0.0387) | 0.0655 (0.1719) |
| CHINA | 1.8317*** (0.1391) | | | | | 2.2392*** (0.5985) | 2.2503*** (0.6010) | 2.3137*** (0.6731) | 2.2551*** (0.5997) | -2.1254*** (0.4429) |
| JP | -1.1883** (0.4146) | | | | | -0.5467 (0.3002) | -0.4236 (0.3720) | -0.5211 (0.3381) | -0.4781 (0.3476) | 1.4543*** (0.1954) |
| US | -0.0756 (0.5768) | | | | | 0.1648 (0.2118) | 0.2065 (0.2160) | 0.1186 (0.2270) | 0.1347 (0.2503) | 0.6700 (0.4520) |
| TOT_EXP | 0.2573*** (0.0301) | | | | | 0.0558* (0.0228) | 0.0523* (0.0251) | 0.0753** (0.0279) | 0.0653*** (0.0189) | -0.0883*** (0.0099) |
| INSTITUTIONAL_DIST | -0.0466 (0.0297) | | | | | -0.0234*** (0.0021) | -0.0264*** (0.0026) | -0.0186*** (0.0025) | -0.0252*** (0.0023) | -0.0306 (0.0304) |
| HORIZONTAL_MA | 0.9806 (0.5664) | | | | | 0.7987* (0.3452) | 0.8165* (0.3510) | 0.8742** (0.3299) | 0.8068* (0.3506) | 0.0844 (0.4238) |
| NO_BIG_ACQ | -2.9471** (0.9592) | | | | | -2.9555** (0.9394) | -3.3865* (1.4048) | -2.9348** (0.9666) | -2.9525** (0.9465) | -1.5762 (1.0476) |
| TARGET_REGIONAL | | | | | | | -0.0052*** (0.0013) | | | |
| ACQUIRER_REGIONAL | | | | | | | | 0.0010** (0.0004) | | |
| TARGET_ACQUIRER | | | | | | | | | 0.0001*** (0.0001) | |
| YEAR DUMMY | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 428 | 428 | 428 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 409 |
| ll | -9.0e+03 | -1.5e+04 | -1.1e+04 | -1.5e+04 | -1.1e+04 | -5.8e+03 | -5.7e+03 | -5.4e+03 | -5.7e+03 | -1.5e+03 |

LEGEND: Legend: *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001. Models are estimated using Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood. Robust Standard errors are reported below coefficients.


Main findings

- ① The stronger the acquirer knowledge base, the more the acquirer patents after the deal;
- ② The stronger the target knowledge base, the lower the acquirers patent after the deal;
- ③ There is a general neutral effect (non significant) of the regional innovative context.


| | Dep. Var.: NUMBER OF INPADOC PATENTS | | | | | | | | | Dep. Var.: N USPTO PATENTS |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Controls | | Independent variables | | Full | | Full with interactions | | | (10) |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
| TARGET_KNOW_BASE | | -0.0031*** (0.0004) | | | -0.0022*** (0.0000) | -0.0010* (0.0005) | 0.0377*** (0.0096) | -0.0010** (0.0004) | -0.0046*** (0.0012) | -0.0016*** (0.0001) |
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| TOT_EXP | 0.2573*** (0.0301) | | | | | 0.0558* (0.0228) | 0.0523* (0.0251) | 0.0753** (0.0279) | 0.0653*** (0.0189) | -0.0883*** (0.0099) |
| INSTITUTIONAL_DIST | -0.0466 (0.0297) | | | | | -0.0234*** (0.0021) | -0.0264*** (0.0026) | -0.0186*** (0.0025) | -0.0252*** (0.0023) | -0.0306 (0.0304) |
| HORIZONTAL_MA | 0.9806 (0.5664) | | | | | 0.7987* (0.3452) | 0.8165* (0.3510) | 0.8742** (0.3299) | 0.8068* (0.3506) | 0.0844 (0.4238) |
| NO_BIG_ACQ | -2.9471** (0.9592) | | | | | -2.9555** (0.9394) | -3.3865* (1.4048) | -2.9348** (0.9666) | -2.9525** (0.9465) | -1.5762 (1.0476) |
| TARGET_REGIONAL | | | | | | | -0.0052*** (0.0013) | | | |
| ACQUIRER_REGIONAL | | | | | | | | 0.0010** (0.0004) | | |
| TARGET_ACQUIRER | | | | | | | | | 0.0001*** (0.0001) | |
| YEAR DUMMY | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 428 | 428 | 428 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 414 | 409 |
| ll | -9.0e+03 | -1.5e+04 | -1.1e+04 | -1.5e+04 | -1.1e+04 | -5.8e+03 | -5.7e+03 | -5.4e+03 | -5.7e+03 | -1.5e+03 |

LEGEND: Legend: *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001. Models are estimated using Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood. Robust Standard errors are reported below coefficients.


Regional and Acquirer Knowledge Base



Acquirer and Target Knowledge Base



Regional and Target Knowledge Base



Concluding remarks

- The more innovative EMNEs take advantage of their acquisitions (and of the knowledge available in the local context) in EU27, Japan and US for further improving their patenting activity;
- Nonetheless, on average EMNEs are still unable to take advantage of their acquisitions to increase their innovativeness because of the existing technological gap;
- With regard to the knowledge context in which the acquired companies are located, it doesn't play a significant role;
- Can we expect that with EMNEs increasing their innovation capacity their ability to take advantage from acquisition will also increase?


EMENDATA

Emerging Multinationals Events and Networks DATAbase

- **Greenfield investments** (*fDiMarkets* - FT) + **M&As** (*Zephyr* - BvD and *SDC Platinum* – Thomson Reuters) (+ minority investments) from EMNEs;
- EMENDATA provides information at the level of the a) **single deal**, b) the **investing company** and c) the **global ultimate owner (GUO)**;
- Information include: a) entry mode; b) sector of specialization of the investing company and of the subsidiaries; c) activities undertaken by the subsidiaries; d) location of the subsidiaries; e) number of jobs created; f) financial information about the investors and the subsidiaries; g) patents of the investors and the subsidiaries;
- Period: 2003-2011 (updating at 2013);
- Focus on EU-27: 3,971 deals.


EMNEs in Europe: From where do they come from?

Figure 1 - Emerging countries FDI to Europe by entry mode (2003-2001) (# deals)




Source: EMENDATA

Where do they go?




Source: EMENDATA (based on Table A3.3, Annex 2)

In which industries they do specialize in?




Source: EMENDATA (based on Table A3.4, Annex 2)


Focus on Brazilian, Chinese and Indian investments




Main country destinations and sectorial specialization of BIC MNE investments in the EU-27



Who are the top investors?





Some findings

- ① **On location drivers:** Crescenzi R., Pietrobelli C., Rabellotti R., 2015, The location strategy of multinationals from emerging countries in the EU regions, *LEQS Papers 93-2015* London School of Economics forthcoming in *European and Planning Studies*;
- ② **On the impact on host regions:** Giuliani E., Gorgoni S. and Guenther C., Rabellotti R., 2014, “Emerging-market MNEs investing in Europe. A typology of subsidiary global–local connections”, *International Business Review*, 23: 680-691;
- ③ **On the impact on investors’ technological capabilities:** Giuliani E., Martinelli A. and Rabellotti R., 2015, Is Co-Invention Expediting Technological Catch Up? A Study of Collaboration between Emerging Country Firms and EU inventors, forthcoming in *World Development*;
- ④ **On the impact on investors 'performance:** Cozza C., Sanfilippo M. and Rabellotti R., 2015, The Impact of Outward FDI on the Performance of Chinese Multinationals, forthcoming in *China Economic Review*.

Thank you

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Table 6 – Robustness check – Two-stage estimation

| | Dep. Var.: N. of INPADOC PATENTS | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Full model | Full model with interactions | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| ACQUIRER_KNOW_BASE | 0.0038*** (0.0001) | 0.0034*** (0.0001) | -0.0033*** (0.0002) | 0.0030*** (0.0001) |
| TARGET_KNOW_BASE | -0.0025*** (0.0002) | 0.0288** (0.0088) | -0.0021*** (0.0002) | -0.0035*** (0.0004) |
| CHINA | 2.3956*** (0.0529) | 1.9964*** (0.0529) | 1.2520*** (0.0524) | 1.3943*** (0.0631) |
| STITUTIONAL_DIST | 0.0059 (0.0047) | -0.0727*** (0.0047) | -0.0903*** (0.0049) | -0.0841*** (0.0049) |
| TOT_EXP | -0.1187*** (0.0066) | -0.0289*** (0.0067) | -0.1026*** (0.0070) | -0.0936*** (0.0083) |
| PRE_2008 | 0.6575*** (0.0385) | 0.3344*** (0.0387) | 0.2052*** (0.0395) | 0.2664*** (0.0387) |
| MANUFACTURING | 0.1207** (0.0464) | -0.3185*** (0.0508) | -0.0163 (0.0494) | -1.1806*** (0.0655) |
| JP | -1.3929*** (0.0908) | -0.6954*** (0.0875) | -0.1688 (0.0910) | -0.0768 (0.0918) |
| US | 0.0369 (0.0720) | 0.3254*** (0.0797) | 0.3658*** (0.0755) | -0.0402 (0.1001) |
| MA_HORIZONTAL | 0.1629* (0.0780) | 0.3597*** (0.0823) | 0.2502** (0.0905) | 0.2658** (0.1008) |
| REGION_KNOW_BASE | -0.3503*** (0.0147) | -0.2350*** (0.0142) | -0.1955*** (0.0154) | -0.2236*** (0.0159) |
| OPERATING_REVENUES | 0.4710*** (0.0093) | 0.6279*** (0.0112) | 0.5587*** (0.0111) | 0.6420*** (0.0134) |
| TARGET*REGION | | -0.0037** (0.0012) | | |
| ACQUIRER*REGION | | | 0.0009*** (0.0000) | |
| ACQUIRER*TARGET | | | | 0.0001*** (0.0001) |
| CONSTANT | -3.4152*** (0.1791) | -5.2491*** (0.1931) | -3.6402*** (0.1951) | -3.8971*** (0.1927) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 2438 | 2438 | 2438 | 2438 |
| LOG LIKELIHOOD | -1.3e+03 | -1.3e+03 | -1.3e+03 | -1.3e+03 |

Legend: *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001. Standard errors are reported below coefficients. In the two-stage test, the selection equation includes revenues, solvency ratio, acquirer knowledge base, manufacturing sector dummy and origin country dummy.

Table 5 – Robustness check – Zero-inflated models

| | Dep. Var.: N. of INPADOC PATENTS | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Full model | Full model with interactions | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| TARGET_KNOW_BASE | -0.0038*** (0.0003) | 0.1867*** (0.0114) | -0.0037*** (0.0003) | -0.0071*** (0.0007) |
| ACQUIRER_KNOW_BASE | 0.0018*** (0.0001) | 0.0019*** (0.0001) | -0.0000 (0.0002) | 0.0018*** (0.0001) |
| CHINA | 1.7217*** (0.0373) | 1.7795*** (0.0375) | 1.6582*** (0.0376) | 1.7493*** (0.0376) |
| PRE_2008 | -0.3573*** (0.0330) | -0.3276*** (0.0332) | -0.3371*** (0.0331) | -0.3750*** (0.0330) |
| JP | 0.1192 (0.0878) | 0.3026*** (0.0887) | 0.1612 (0.0881) | 0.1875* (0.0886) |
| US | 0.0810 (0.0514) | 0.3113*** (0.0530) | 0.0280 (0.0512) | 0.0873 (0.0518) |
| TOT_EXP | -0.0498*** (0.0060) | -0.0585*** (0.0060) | -0.0482*** (0.0060) | -0.0475*** (0.0059) |
| STITUTIONAL_DIST | 0.0199*** (0.0033) | 0.0119*** (0.0033) | 0.0287*** (0.0034) | 0.0206*** (0.0033) |
| MA_HORIZONTAL | 0.1592* (0.0668) | 0.2158** (0.0670) | 0.2136** (0.0669) | 0.1816** (0.0670) |
| REGION_KNOW_BASE | -0.0867*** (0.0096) | -0.0490*** (0.0099) | -0.1373*** (0.0101) | -0.0864*** (0.0096) |
| MANUFACTURING | 0.1448*** (0.0316) | 0.2730*** (0.0328) | 0.3173*** (0.0357) | 0.1531*** (0.0317) |
| NO_BIG_ACQ | -1.4826*** (0.1432) | -1.4226*** (0.1430) | -1.3795*** (0.1434) | -1.4918*** (0.1433) |
| TARGET*REGION | | -0.0252*** (0.0015) | | |
| ACQUIRER*REGION | | | 0.0003*** (0.0000) | |
| ACQUIRER*TARGET | | | | 0.0001*** (0.0001) |
| CONSTANT | 3.1296*** (0.1161) | 2.7370*** (0.1195) | 3.2124*** (0.1139) | 3.0972*** (0.1165) |
| OBSERVATIONS | 452 | 452 | 452 | 452 |
| LOG LIKELIHOOD | -4.2e+03 | -4.0e+03 | -4.1e+03 | -4.1e+03 |

Legend: *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001. Standard errors are reported below coefficients. In the Zero-Inflated Poisson test, the inflate equation includes origin country dummy, manufacturing sector dummy, acquirer knowledge base and acquirer size.